American tech executives are facing escalated and systematic campaigns by foreign intelligence services using a variety of spy tactics to get the upper hand, including “honeytraps,” to infiltrate U.S. expert controls, supply chains and other intelligence, experts say.
The warning comes amid reports revealing NVIDIA CEO Jensen Huang’s extramarital relationship with Megaspeed executive Alice Huang, whom U.S. intelligence identified as a Chinese intelligence asset operating under corporate cover.
Foreign espionage operations targeting high-profile tech figures are not isolated incidents but reflect an ongoing, long-term threat designed to exploit business environments, former National Security Agency analyst and corporate cybersecurity expert Ira Winkler told Fox News Digital.
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“In this case, this is what the honey trap was, where they used sex, apparently, as the way to establish a relationship that was apparently not necessarily coercion, but did maintain long-term access and play to the person’s ego,” Winkler said. “These types of cases have gone on over the last few decades and arguably since the days of Samson, if you want to get biblical on how long honey pots have been around.”
Unlike traditional covert intelligence operations, foreign adversaries routinely target tech executives through legitimate business settings when their defenses are lowered, Winkler said.
“Tech events are prime targets, where people can go ahead and meet other people who might potentially have access,” Winkler explained.
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He noted that chief executives rarely mingle on the street or in public venues. Instead, spies are deployed into professional settings in an effort to leverage opportunities to initiate contact.
In the case involving Nvidia, an artificial intelligence giant, Alice Huang was granted access through business interactions as an executive connected to the Singapore-based Megaspeed International, which federal investigators suspect functioned as a front to bypass export restrictions on AI hardware.
“This is where they had long-term access and clear cooperation in many cases, to go ahead to try to avoid export restrictions, to potentially get information,” Winkler said. “Spies are trained on how to be social, how to meet people in social situations, wherever they might hang out and elevate the situations.”
The intersection of AI and foreign espionage has amplified scrutiny on Silicon Valley leadership. Intelligence officials have warned that top executives must treat routine networking as possible entry points for foreign state actors, Winkler said.
Security experts have stressed that human vulnerabilities remain the primary source through which U.S. adversaries attempt to undermine America’s technological superiority.
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While popular portrayals of “honeytraps” focus on immediate extortion or coercion, modern corporate espionage generally focuses on long-term, sustained access, Winkler said.
Meaning, rather than a quick blackmail scheme, foreign intelligence services use personal relationships to build long-term influence to gather insights on executive decision-making.
“In this case, I doubt that there was that level of extortion,” said Winkler. “But the fact that the woman was able to maintain a relationship with this person for years, apparently at this point in time, where the person was essentially acting on behalf of China, in some ways … it does create questions.”