America has crossed the Rubicon with Iran. There is no going back to the world that existed before this war, no matter how much we might wish otherwise. We have attacked Iran’s military infrastructure, inflicted enormous damage on its economy and demonstrated that the United States is prepared to use overwhelming force. Now, at precisely the moment when we have gained the upper hand, Washington seems increasingly preoccupied with how quickly we can declare victory, bring down gasoline prices and move on.
That would be a terrible mistake.
The question is whether America is about to squander the military advantage it has gained over Iran. The answer depends on whether we understand the difference between stopping a war and achieving the objectives for which we fought it.
FINISH THE JOB: WHY A HALF WAR WITH IRAN IS THE MOST DANGEROUS OUTCOME
We need to be clear about the regime we are dealing with. The Islamic Republic is not simply another country with which we have disagreements over trade, borders or diplomatic recognition. Since 1979, hostility toward America and Israel has been woven into the regime’s revolutionary ideology. That is not a judgment about the Iranian people, many of whom want nothing more than a normal life. It is a judgment about the government that has ruled them for nearly half a century.
Look at the history. In 1979, Iranian revolutionaries seized our embassy and held 52 Americans hostage for 444 days. In 1983, Hezbollah, which Iran helped create and arm, carried out the Beirut Marine barracks bombing that killed 241 American servicemen. In 1994, the bombing of the AMIA Jewish community center in Buenos Aires killed 85 people; an Argentine court subsequently held Iran responsible and concluded that Hezbollah carried out the attack. In 2011, American authorities uncovered an Iranian-linked plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in a Washington restaurant, potentially killing innocent Americans.
These were not isolated misunderstandings that could have been resolved over coffee. They occurred across decades, under Republican and Democratic administrations, during periods of confrontation and diplomatic engagement. Iran has repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to use terrorism, proxies and intimidation to advance its interests. Its leaders have called for Israel’s elimination while building the military capabilities to threaten it.
Can we negotiate with this regime? Of course. We have to. But we should understand what those negotiations can realistically accomplish. I do not believe we are going to negotiate the Islamic Republic into becoming a responsible Western-style democracy or a reliable friend of Israel. We may buy periods of quiet, obtain useful concessions or even reach agreements that reduce the danger for years. But none of that necessarily changes the underlying ideology or ambitions of the regime.
TRUMP CAN’T LET IRAN TURN A MILITARY DEFEAT TURN INTO A DIPLOMATIC VICTORY
Diplomacy with Iran is, in many respects, about buying peace one day at a time while maintaining enough leverage to make renewed aggression unattractive. That leverage must be real. Not another strongly worded statement from Washington or another warning that all options remain on the table. Iran has heard those warnings for decades.
Before this war, Iran had developed an extraordinary combination of nuclear expertise, ballistic missiles, drones, underground facilities and regional proxy networks. By June 2025, the International Atomic Energy Agency reported approximately 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60% purity, technically close to the roughly 90% level associated with weapons-grade material. That did not mean Iran possessed a functioning nuclear weapon, but it demonstrated how far its enrichment program had advanced. Its missiles could reach Israel and American installations throughout the region. Its Shahed drones were being used by Russia against Ukraine. Its scientists and military planners had spent decades developing the ability to manufacture, conceal and replenish these capabilities.
AFTER 47 YEARS OF CONFRONTING IRAN, DOES AMERICA HAVE A STRATEGY FOR ENDING THIS WAR?
The original nuclear agreement, the JCPOA, should have taught us an important lesson. Iran accepted temporary restrictions but retained the scientific expertise, industrial infrastructure and technical capacity to rebuild its nuclear program. When those restrictions unraveled, Tehran demonstrated how rapidly it could advance toward weapons-grade enrichment. Meanwhile, the International Atomic Energy Agency uncovered undeclared nuclear material and activities that raised serious questions about Iran’s transparency. The lesson is not complicated: an agreement that slows a dangerous program is not the same as one that permanently eliminates the threat. We cannot afford to confuse a diplomatic document with a durable security arrangement.
Had we never confronted Iran militarily, those capabilities could have continued to grow. Iran might eventually have been able to choose the timing and circumstances of a confrontation rather than leaving that initiative to us. Now we have acted. We have paid the price, accepted the risks and crossed the threshold into direct military confrontation. What would be the point of all that if we simply allowed Iran to rebuild?
TRUMP PUSHED IRAN TO THE BRINK — BUT DID WE WIN ANYTHING THAT LASTS?
Imagine two Middle Easts five years from now.
In the first, Washington announces that the war is over. The military goes home. The pressure comes off. Oil prices decline, at least initially, and everyone celebrates. Meanwhile, Iran’s surviving leadership quietly begins rebuilding its missile factories, drone production facilities and underground nuclear infrastructure. Money starts flowing again to Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis and other armed groups. The regime has learned valuable lessons about our weapons, intelligence capabilities and, perhaps most importantly, our political patience. Five years later, we face an Iran that is better prepared, more deeply entrenched and potentially more dangerous than the one we confronted.
IRAN’S DEEPEST WEAKNESS IS GETTING EXPOSED THROUGH AMERICA’S MAXIMUM PRESSURE CAMPAIGN
Now imagine the second Middle East. We continue negotiating, but also maintain tough financial sanctions, lawful maritime pressure and an active military component. When intelligence establishes that Iran is restoring threatening military capabilities, and force is legally justified, we retain the ability and willingness to act. Missile and drone manufacturing remain constrained. Nuclear reconstruction is subject to verification and credible consequences. Iran’s ability to finance and arm its proxies is diminished. The regime may never surrender or abandon its ideology, but its capacity to turn that ideology into military action is substantially reduced.
That is what I mean by putting Iran in a box. We do not need to occupy the country, install a new government or demand a surrender ceremony in Tehran. We need to make it exceedingly difficult for the regime to rebuild the capabilities that threaten America, Israel and our allies.
TRUMP’S PRESSURE CAMPAIGN HAS IRAN REELING. AMERICA CAN’T HESITATE NOW
Consider Pickaxe Mountain, the deeply buried complex near Natanz. Analysts have documented extensive construction and hardening activity, although its operational purpose has not been conclusively established. Iran’s investment in facilities designed to withstand attack should remind us that destroying existing infrastructure is not the same as preventing reconstruction. We need inspections, intelligence and a willingness to enforce meaningful restrictions. We should not assume that every construction project is a legitimate military target, but neither should we wait passively while a demonstrable threat is reconstituted.
Our strategy needs three legs, and all three must operate simultaneously.
The first is diplomacy. We should negotiate continuously and seriously, offering Iran a verifiable path toward reduced isolation in exchange for meaningful nuclear restrictions, an end to threatening regional activities and respect for freedom of navigation.
The second is economic pressure. Financial sanctions, restrictions on weapons-related technology and lawful enforcement around the Strait of Hormuz must continue to limit the regime’s ability to finance military reconstruction and its proxy networks.
The third is military force. And I do not mean merely threatening to use it someday. I mean the sustained, periodic and deliberate use of kinetic force against legitimate military targets, guided by intelligence and justified under international and domestic law. Iran must understand that rebuilding its threatening military capabilities is not a risk-free exercise undertaken between rounds of diplomacy. When renewed military activity presents a demonstrable threat and the legal conditions for force are met, America must be prepared to act repeatedly, not simply issue another warning. This is not about launching another full-scale war every six months. It is about ensuring that military pressure remains an active instrument of our strategy, operating alongside diplomacy and sanctions rather than waiting for both to fail. Every operation must have a defined military objective, comply with the law of armed conflict and account for the risks of escalation. The regime should never be allowed to mistake a pause in American military operations for permission to rebuild the capabilities we went to war to destroy.
TRUMP KEEPS NEGOTIATING WHILE IRAN PLAYS THE LONG GAME AMERICA KEEPS MISSING
This is where I part company with those who believe that once the shooting stops, diplomacy and sanctions alone will finish the job. We have spent decades testing the limits of warnings, sanctions and negotiations. We should be realistic about both their value and their limitations.
Congress is understandably worried about gasoline and fertilizer prices. So am I. The Strait of Hormuz is critical to global energy markets, and disruptions affect farmers, businesses and families far beyond the Middle East. But this is not a choice between war and expensive gasoline on one side and peace and cheap gasoline on the other. That is a dangerously simplistic way to evaluate national security.
An Iran capable of threatening Gulf oil facilities, international shipping and neighboring countries can impose enormous economic costs whenever it chooses. A nuclear-armed Iran, or one able to approach that capability rapidly, would present an even greater strategic challenge. Continued military operations also carry costs and risks, including retaliation and prolonged economic disruption. Those risks must be weighed carefully. But a few months of lower gasoline prices would be a poor bargain if the result were a more dangerous Iran five years from now.
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The administration has not done nearly enough to explain this to Congress or the American people. We hear about destroyed targets and military victories, negotiations and the possibility of ending the war. What we hear far less about is what happens afterward. How do we prevent Iran from rebuilding? What constitutes a verifiable agreement? What are the consequences if Tehran cheats? And what does victory actually look like?
Victory does not mean Iran becomes Switzerland. It does not mean the mullahs embrace Western values or suddenly recognize Israel. It means Iran cannot acquire nuclear weapons, cannot readily rebuild threatening missile and drone capabilities, cannot finance its regional proxies at previous levels and cannot routinely hold international commerce hostage. It means that even if the regime remains hostile, its ability to act on that hostility is significantly constrained.
We have poked the bear. It is wounded, angry and dangerous. We should expect it to look for opportunities to recover and lash out. The answer is not to assume that a wounded bear has suddenly become tame, nor is it to fight without limits or an endgame. The answer is to maintain a strategy that keeps the threat contained while creating opportunities for a verifiable diplomatic settlement.
We crossed the Rubicon when we decided to use military force against Iran. We cannot undo that decision, and we should not squander the advantage it created. Diplomacy, economic pressure and active military enforcement must work together. None is sufficient by itself.
We do not need to fight forever. But we cannot simply stop fighting, declare victory and hope Iran plays nice. We have come too far, spent too much and accepted too many risks to confuse a pause in the shooting with the end of the threat.